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The Sorcerer's Apprentice:
Sandoval Chevron, and Agency Power
To Define Private Rights of Action
Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2003); Jackson v. Birmingham
Board of Education, 309 F.3d 1333 (1 1th Cir. 2002), petition for cert.filed,
71 U.S.L.W. 3736 (U.S. May 13, 2003) (No. 02-1672).
Private individuals have long played a key role in enforcing federal
rights.' Yet in a series of recent decisions, the Supreme Court has limited
the ability of individuals to enforce federal rights through private suits. 2 In
Alexander v. Sandoval, for example, the Court held that there was no
private right of action to enforce disparate impact regulations promulgated
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 3 It is unclear, however,
whether that decision precluded private rights of action to enforce other
regulations promulgated under Title VI and comparable civil rights statutes.
1. See Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Eleventh Amendment Schizophrenia, 75 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 859, 873 (2000) ("[T]hroughout our history, the constitutional rights of individuals and
minorities have primarily been enforced through private suits."); Rebecca E. Zietlow,
Federalism's Paradox: The Spending Power and Waiver of Sovereign Immunity, 37 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 141, 214-15 (2002) ("[E]nforcement [of federal law] by private individuals is
particularly important in the area of civil rights.... One reason for that reliance is that the federal
government simply lacks the resources to prosecute numerous violations of civil rights.");
cf Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the Spending Power, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 89, 104 (2001) (arguing
that Congress needs to be able to "condition federal funds on a state's waiver of its sovereign
immunity" to "ensur[e] accountability"). This role is made necessary by limited governmental
resources. See, e.g., Zietlow, supra, at 208 n.409 (discussing studies noting the decrease in federal
enforcement of civil rights over the last decade).
2. See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002); Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181
(2002); see also William E. Thro & Derek P. Langhauser, Emerging Limitations on Federal
Authority, 176 EDUC. L. REP. 505, 509-12 (2003) (discussing limitations on private enforcement
of federal statutes and regulations).
3. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
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Even more significantly, Sandoval left unclear whether, and to what extent,
federal agencies can shape private rights of action.
While Sandoval's broad language implied that agencies .can play only a
limited role in creating private rights of action, its holding still allows
substantial room for agencies to define those rights. Indeed, a recent split
between the Fourth and the Eleventh Circuits illustrates that Sandoval does
not necessarily preclude agencies from playing such a role. Although the
Eleventh Circuit, in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education,4 held that
there was no private right of action to enforce anti-retaliation regulations
promulgated under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, the
Fourth Circuit, in Peters v. Jenney,5 held that a private individual can sue
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to enforce the anti-retaliation
regulations promulgated under that statute.6 The critical distinction between
the two courts' analyses was the significance each attached to the
requirement of deference to agency regulations established by Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc.7
This Comment argues that the Fourth Circuit was correct to incorporate
Chevron into its analysis, and that its decision suggests a role for agencies
in creating implied private rights of action that is much greater than the one
articulated in Sandoval. While Sandoval may prevent agencies from
creating private rights of action by themselves, they can achieve much the
same effect by expansively interpreting the statutory rights of action created
by Congress. With careful regulatory and statutory drafting, agencies and
Congress can-and should--capitalize on the Chevron deference shown by
the Fourth Circuit in Peters v. Jenney.
I.
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits racial discrimination
in all programs that receive federal funding. 8 Section 601 of Title VI
provides that no person shall "on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
4. 309 F.3d 1333 (1lth Cir. 2002),petition for cert. filed, 71 U.S.L.W. 3736 (U.S. May 13,
2003) (No. 02-1672).
5. 327 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2003).
6. Title IX and Title VI are in pari materia. Therefore the circuits are functionally in conflict
despite the fact that the cases deal with different statutes. See id. at 326 (Widener, J., dissenting).
7. 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding that courts should defer to reasonable agency interpretations
of the statutes they enforce where congressional intent is ambiguous). A federal district court has
identified this circuit split, see Chandamuri v. Georgetown Univ., 274 F. Supp. 2d 71, 81-83
(D.D.C. 2003), but that court did not discuss the differing importance the Fourth and Eleventh
Circuits attached to Chevron. Instead, Chandamuri relied on statutory interpretation to decide that
the Fourth Circuit was correct to recognize a private right of action for retaliation. See infra
note 33.
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000).
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subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance." 9 Section 602 authorizes federal agencies that
administer programs covered by section 601 to "effectuate the provisions of
[section 601]... by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general
applicability."' ° Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which
prohibits gender discrimination in educational programs receiving federal
funding, was patterned after Title VI and has a similar structure.11 Section
901 prohibits discrimination, 2 while section 902 empowers agencies to
"effectuate the provisions of' section 901.13
In Alexander v. Sandoval, a private individual sued to enforce a
regulation promulgated by the Department of Justice under Title VI.14 This
regulation prohibited funding recipients from "utiliz[ing] criteria or
methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to
discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin.'" 5 The Court
held that there was no implied private right of action to enforce such a
regulation. Although the Court had earlier recognized an implied private
right of action to enforce section 601,16 it held that Sandoval's suit could
not be brought pursuant to that right, as the Court had previously construed
section 601 to permit the disparate impact practices that the regulations
prohibited. 17 Therefore, the plaintiff could bring a private action only if one
existed under section 602 or the regulation itself The Court searched the
structure and text of section 602 for clear evidence of congressional intent
to create a private right of action, but found none, relying in large part on
the lack of "rights-creating language" in the text of section 602.18
The Court then turned to the DOJ regulation. Although the regulation
contained the "rights-creating language" that, in statutory text, would have
suggested the existence of an implied private right of action, the Court
quickly dismissed the possibility that the regulation itself could create such
a right: "Language in a regulation may invoke a private right of action that
Congress through statutory text created, but it may not create a right that
Congress has not .... Agencies may play the sorcerer's apprentice but not
the sorcerer himself."'19 Thus, Sandoval seemed to restrict significantly the
9. Id.
10. Id. § 2000d-l.
11. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 694 (1979) ("Title IX was patterned after
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.").
12. See2OU.S.C. § 1681(a).
13. Id. § 1682.
14. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
15. 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2003). A similar regulation was promulgated by the
Department of Transportation. See 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(2).
16. See Cannon, 441 U.S. 677.
17. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978) (plurality opinion)
(holding that section 601 prohibits only intentional discrimination).
18. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288 (internal quotation marks omitted).
19. Id. at 291 (citing Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 577 n.18 (1979)).
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role that federal agencies could play in creating private rights of action. Yet
as the split between the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits suggests, appearances
can be deceiving.
II
Cheryl Peters was hired by the Virginia Beach School Board to serve as
Director of Gifted Education and Magnet Programs. In this role, she
worked to promote minority enrollment in the school district's gifted and
talented program. When the Board decided not to renew Peters's
probationary contract, she claimed that it was because of her work to end
discrimination, and filed suit.20 Her claim was based in part on a
Department of Education Title VI regulation, which provides that "[n]o
recipient or other person shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or discriminate
against any individual for the purpose of interfering with any right or
privilege secured by section 601 of the Act., 21 The district court granted the
Board's motion for summary judgment, and the Fourth Circuit reversed.22
Roderick Jackson coached the girls' basketball team at Ensley High
School. He complained to his supervisors that the girls' team was not
receiving the same support as the boys' team, and the school subsequently
relieved him of his coaching duties.23 The Department of Education had
incorporated by reference its Title VI regulations to enforce Title IX, 24 and
Jackson sued the school board, alleging that it had retaliated against him in
violation of Title IX and the implementing regulations. The district court
dismissed his complaint, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
In determining whether a private right of action exists to enforce the
anti-retaliation regulations promulgated under Title IX, the Eleventh Circuit
attempted to follow Sandoval by searching for clear congressional intent to
create a private right of action. The court first examined the text of section
901 and found no suggestion of "any congressional concern with
retaliation., 26 As Sandoval had held with respect to section 602, Jackson
held that section 902 was "concerned exclusively with the power of federal
agencies to regulate recipients of federal funds .... [It] plainly does not
disclose any congressional intent to imply a private right of action of any
kind .... ,27 Finally, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed the idea that the
20. Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 313 (4th Cir. 2003).
21. 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e) (2003).
22. See Peters, 327 F.3d at 310-11.
23. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333, 1335 (11 th Cir. 2002),petition for
cert.filed, 71 U.S.L.W. 3736 (U.S. May 13, 2003) (No. 02-1672).
24. 34 C.F.R. § 106.71.
25. Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1335.
26. Id. at 1344.
27. Id. at 1345 (citation omitted).
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regulations themselves could create a private right of action: "Quite simply,
if Congress did not enact a statute creating a private cause of action, we
cannot find its intent to do so in this regulation.,
28
The Eleventh Circuit's conclusion is unsurprising given Sandoval's
repeated declarations that Congress must clearly state its intent to create a
private right of action. Yet the Eleventh Circuit failed to recognize that
Sandoval's rejection of a private right of action in the absence of clear
congressional intent was limited to section 602.29 It did not apply to section
601, for which the Court had previously recognized a private right of
action. More problematically, the Jackson court ignored altogether the role
that Chevron deference should play in determining the proper scope of a
private right of action. As the Fourth Circuit noted, Sandoval acknowledged
that "regulations applying § 601's ban on intentional discrimination are
covered by the cause of action to enforce that section."30 Yet the Eleventh
Circuit did not even consider the possibility that the anti-retaliation
regulations might be applying section 901's ban on intentional
discrimination.
In Sandoval, prior case law had already determined that section 601
prohibited only intentional discrimination. The Court thus could not
consider the disparate impact regulations at issue to be an authoritative
interpretation of section 601 or an application of that section's ban on
intentional discrimination. 31 But there were no such precedents constraining
agency interpretations of the intentional discrimination prohibition with
respect to retaliation. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit relied upon this distinction
28. Id. at 1346.
29. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288-89 (2001).
30. Id. at 284, cited in Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 315 (4th Cir. 2003). The distinction
between regulations "applying § 601's ban on intentional discrimination" and regulations
promulgated under section 602 to "effectuate the provisions of § 601" is an important one given
that a private right of action exists only for the former. The difference, however, is not always
clear. Presumably, regulations "applying"--i.e., interpreting-section 601 define and explain the
meaning of its provisions, while regulations promulgated to effectuate its provisions under section
602 are new programs or prohibitions that cannot be said to fall within the confines of section
601's language but achieve objectives broadly compatible with its goals. Thus, regulations
defining which entities are recipients of federal financial assistance might fall under section 601,
because they explicate the meaning of that section. But regulations requiring employers to include
their nondiscrimination policy in advertisements for employees might fall under section 602,
because while not directly applying section 601, they help agencies achieve the broad goals of that
section. Agencies themselves need to be sensitive to this distinction. By casting their regulations
as interpretations of statutory language, they can maximize the likelihood that courts will defer to
the regulations. See infra notes 40-42 and accompanying text.
31. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 281 n.1; cf Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 173 (1993) (refusing to allow private individuals to sue under an SEC rule
for "conduct not prohibited by the text of the statute"). Indeed, in writing for the Court, Justice
Scalia was prevented from dismissing as invalid the disparate impact regulations because of past
precedent and the parties' stipulations, but he recognized them as applications of section 602, not
section 601. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 281. It has been suggested that the Sandoval majority
"hint[ed]" that the regulations are themselves invalid. Note, After Sandoval: Judicial Challenges
and Administrative Possibilities in Title VI Enforcement, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1774, 1775 (2003).
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between the disparate impact regulation at issue in Sandoval and the
regulation that it was considering. It quoted Sandoval's assertion that "it
is... meaningless to talk about a separate cause of action to enforce the
regulations apart from the statute. A Congress that intends the statute to be
enforced through a private cause of action intends the authoritative
interpretation of the statute to be so enforced as well.",32 The critical
question the Fourth Circuit then confronted was whether the regulation's
prohibition on retaliation was part of the authoritative interpretation of
Title VI. Examining a series of cases in which courts had held that similar
civil rights statutes included private rights of action to enforce retaliation
prohibitions, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the agency "quite reasonably
could construe § 601 to forbid purposeful retaliation based upon opposition
to practices made unlawful by § 601." 33 The Fourth Circuit considered itself
bound to defer to this interpretation under Chevron and found a private
right of action to enforce the regulation.
III
Ensuring that agencies have the power to create private rights of action
through expansive interpretations of statutory law will contribute
significantly to the effective enforcement of federal law. 34 Even if there are
few areas in which the courts currently recognize implied private rights of
action, the ability of agencies to expand upon statutorily created private
rights of action can also be important in those instances when Congress
32. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 284, quoted in Peters, 327 F.3d at 315.
33. Peters, 327 F.3d at 318; see also Chandamuri v. Georgetown Univ., 274 F. Supp. 2d 71,
81-83 (D.D.C. 2003). The Chandamuri court ultimately agreed with the Fourth Circuit, but did
not base its reasoning on the regulations under section 601 (or 602). Instead, it argued that
Supreme Court precedent had held retaliation to be intentional discrimination, and therefore
determined that a retaliation claim fell under section 601 without examining the regulations.
Chandamuri, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 83 (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); and
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969)). This exercise in statutory interpretation is
one possible approach to the narrow issue of the Jackson-Peters circuit split. However, by
focusing on the ability of agencies to define the scope of the statutes that they are entrusted to
enforce, this Comment's approach provides a more robust and general protection of private rights
of action than does the Chandamuri court's focus on prior anti-retaliation decisions.
34. That limitations on the ability to bring private rights of action may limit the effectiveness
of antidiscrimination statutes is indicated by the voluminous literature that appeared in the
aftermath of Sandoval. Many commentators have attempted to identify means of ensuring
continued enforcement of the disparate impact regulations promulgated under Title VI and Title
IX despite the Sandoval ruling. See, e.g., Jonathan M.H. Short, "Something of a Sport":
The Effect of Sandoval on Title IX Disparate Impact Discrimination Suits, 9 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 119, 137-42 (2002) (arguing that individuals may be able to enforce the regulations
by suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Note, supra note 31, at 1789-96 (discussing ways to improve
agency enforcement of Title VI post-Sandoval); Derek Black, Comment, Picking Up the Pieces
After Alexander v. Sandoval: Resurrecting a Private Cause of Action for Disparate Impact, 81
N.C. L. REV. 356, 376-90 (2002) (arguing that individuals may be able to enforce Title VI under a
theory of "deliberate indifference" or by proving intent to discriminate).
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explicitly creates a private right of action. Congress, after all, will often be
unable to determine in advance how best to enforce the federal rights that it
creates,35 and agencies, the entities authorized to enforce the law, will be in
the best position to determine when private suits-and what kinds of
private suits-will be a useful supplement to government enforcement.36
Despite the importance of agency power to create private rights of
action, Justice Scalia wrote dismissively of the role federal agencies can
play in creating private rights of action in Sandoval, describing them as
mere apprentices.37 Yet the Fourth Circuit's decision reveals that agencies
can play a significant role in defining private rights of action. Even if only
Congress may create private rights of action out of nothing, federal
agencies' ability to define and interpret the language in those statutes
effectively gives agencies the power to create private rights of action
wherever that initial statutory grant of power exists. 38 After all, once
Congress enacts a statutory provision prohibiting, for example, intentional
discrimination, it is up to the federal agencies to define what intentional
discrimination does and does not encompass. In so doing, agencies may
provide any definition that is reasonable under the language of the statute.39
While agency interpretations of statutory language should receive
deference under Chevron,40 that deference will not result in a private right
35. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(noting "that no statute can be entirely precise, and that some judgments, even some judgments
involving policy considerations, must be left to the officers executing the law and to the judges
applying it").
36. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Role of the Judiciary in Implementing an Agency
Theory of Government, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1251 (1989) (arguing that where Congress does
not legislate, the courts should defer to the Executive because of its expertise and greater political
accountability).
37. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291.
38. The courts have consistently recognized an implied private right of action under section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder. See
Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) ("The existence of this implied
remedy [under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 1Ob-5] is simply beyond peradventure.").
This private right of action derives from judicial decision, see Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69
F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), and not from- agency rulemaking. But one commentator has
suggested that the SEC can, if it chooses, use its power under Chevron to "disimply" this right.
See Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities
Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 963, 983 (1994). This suggests that,
under Chevron, agencies have power to define the scope of private rights of action, and can use
that power to restrict or expand those private rights, depending on the agency's own enforcement
philosophy. If the SEC can decide to restrict broad private lOb-5 actions in connection with its
enforcement of the Securities Exchange Act, the agencies charged with enforcing the civil rights
laws should have similar freedom in deciding whether to expand private rights of action to aid in
enforcement of their statutory mandates.
39. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
40. Not all agency actions, however, receive Chevron deference. See, e.g., United States v.
Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (denying Chevron deference to a tariff ruling adopted without
rulemaking or adjudicative processes). Therefore, agencies seeking to establish a private right of
action should use procedures that will trigger the application of Chevron deference when they are
adopting relevant regulations.
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of action unless the agency interpretation is of a provision for which a
private right of action already exists-either because Congress has
explicitly provided for one or the courts have recognized an implied one.4'
Therefore, when agencies attempt to use their Chevron power to create
private rights of action through regulation, they should explicitly
promulgate their regulations as an interpretation of statutory language for
which a private right of action already exists. Peters would have been an
easier case had the Department of Education been sensitive to the
distinction between "interpreting" section 601 and "effectuating its
provisions" when it drafted its regulation. 42 A court is far more likely to
construe a regulation as an interpretation of a statute-and thus to apply
Chevron deference-if that regulation is explicitly written to define the
meaning of statutory language. If the regulation is framed as an
interpretation of the section for which a private right of action exists, a
reviewing court that does not want to recognize an implied private right of
action has only two options: It can ignore Chevron, or it can hold that the
interpretation is not reasonable under the statutory language.
Indeed, despite Chevron, courts have been able to interpret statutory
language narrowly and thus limit agency power;43 presumably they could
do the same with regard to private rights of action. But Congress retains
ultimate authority to draft statutory language. To the extent that Congress
uses broad language in statutes that create (or imply) private rights of
action, courts should be more likely to find that Congress did not speak to
the precise issue at question, and agencies should have greater discretion to
interpret that language and give it meaning.
The literal language of Sandoval may prevent agencies from creating
private rights of action by themselves. But the power they retain is equally
significant: They can functionally create private rights of action by
expanding and defining those private rights of action that Congress (or the
Court) has created. Even if agencies can only play the "sorcerer's
apprentice," that is a role of considerable power. Agencies can-and
should-make use of it.
-Brianne J. Gorod
41. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 284.
42. The Department of Education, however, states that the purpose of the anti-retaliation
regulation, 34 C.F.R. § 100.7 (2003), is "to effectuate the provisions of Title VI," 34 C.F.R.
§ 100.1. The extent to which an agency's own description of a regulation should influence a
court's determination of whether that regulation merits Chevron deference is an important
question, but one that is beyond the scope of this Comment.
43. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291; see also, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S.
218, 225 (1994) (construing a statute so narrowly as to withhold Chevron deference from an
agency interpretation); Michael P. Healy, Spurious Interpretation Redux: Mead and the Shrinking
Domain of Statutory Ambiguity, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 673, 677 (2002) (arguing that the Court
narrowed the scope of Chevron's application in Mead by imputing a particular legislative intent to
Congress).
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